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with the views expressed in
Shenk, J., Carter J., and Spence, J., conJ.~-I dissent. I agree with the reasoning in the
prepared by Mr. Presiding ,Tu:stiee Barnard for the
District Court of Ap1wal in Oounty of San Diego v. San
Gas & Electric Oo. (Cal.App), 299 P.2d 664.

J., concurred.
Hl57.
that the

's petition for a rehearing was denied JYiareh
Sehanl'r. ,J., and 1\IcComb, ,] ., were of' the opinion
ition should be granted.

[L. A. No. 24123.

Iu Bunk.

J1"eb. 19, 1957.]

MARION WILDMAN et al. Appellants, v. GOVEHNl\'lEN'f
KMPLOYEES' INSUHANCE COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent.
lb] Automobiles-Insurance-Persons Insured.-A restrictive
endorsement on an automobile liability policy was ambiguous
where it defined "insured" as including "the named insured,
the individual named below, and any member of the insured's
immediate family" and, after the words "No ExCEPTIONs,"
continued, "while using the automobile or legally responsible
for the use thereof, provided the actual use of the automobile
is with the permission of the named insured"; the words
"No EXCEP'l.'IOKS" apparently applied to the named insured
and members of his immediate family while any of them were
using the automobile or had consented and permitted its use
by someone else, since the phrase referring to use with consent
and permission would otherwise have no effect; hence the
policy must be construed as extending coverage to persons
suffering bodily injury or property damage caused by the
vehicle in question when it was being driven by the named
insured or members of their immediate family, and also by
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Insurance, § 276; Am.Jur., Insurance, § 166.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 5] Automobiles,§ 68-1; [2, 4] Insurance,§ 60; [3] Insurance,§ 62; [6] Automobiles,§ 78; [7, 9] Automobiles, § 68-3; [8, 10] Automobiles, § 68.
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someone else driving the vehicle with the consent and permission of the named insured.
[2] Insurance- Interpretation of Contract- Against Insurer.Any ambiguity or uncertainty in an insurance policy must be
resolved against the insurer.
(3] !d.-Interpretation of Contract-With Reference to Objects.
-If semantically permissible, an insurance contract will be
given such construction as will fairly achieve its object of
securing indemnity to the insured for the losses to which the
insurance relates.
[4a, 4b] !d.-Interpretation of Contract-Against Insurer.-If an
insurer uses language which is uncertain any reasonable doubt
will be resolved against it; if the doubt relates to extent or
fact of coverage, whether as to the peril insured against, the
amount of liability, or the person or persons protected, the
language will be understood in its most inclusive sense, for
the insured's benefit.
[5] Automobiles-Insurance-Persons Insured.-The words "no
exceptions" in a restrictive endorsement on an automobile
policy cannot apply to use of the automobile by another with
the consent and permission of the insured where such use
is specifically set forth later in the same paragraph in which
the quoted words appear.
[6] Id.-Insurance-Findings.-A finding that the coverage afforded by an automobile liability policy applies only when
one of the named insureds or members of their immediate
family are using the car, and also when someone else is driving with the consent and permission of the insured, is inconsistent since the coverage afforded by the policy cannot apply
two ways at the same time.
[7] Id.-Insurance-Risks-Exceptions.-An insurance company
does not have the right to limit its coverage in an automobile
liability policy issued by it by excluding coverage when the
automobile is used by someone other than the insured with
the insured's permission, in view of Veh. Code, §§ 402, 415,
which are a part of every such policy.
[8] !d.-Insurance-Law as Part of Contract.-Veh. Code, § 415,
requiring a liability policy to insure the person named therein
"and any other person using or responsible for the use of
said motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or
implied permission of said assured," must be made a part of
every policy of insurance issued by an insurer, since the
public policy of the state is to make owners of motor vehicles
financially responsible to those injured by them in the operation of such vehicles.
[9] Id.-Insurance-Risks-Exceptions.--For an insurer to issue
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an insurance policy which does not cover an accident which
occurs when a person other than the insured is driving with
the insured's permission and consent is a violation of the
public policy of this state as set forth in Veh. Code, §§ 402, 415.
[10] !d.-Insurance--Law as Part of Contract.-Inasmuch as Veh.
Code, §§ 402, 415, relating to civil liability and financial
responsibility of owners and operators of vehicles, set forth
the public policy of the state, such laws must be considered
a part of every liability policy though the policy itself does
not specifically make them a part thereof.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County. Charles C. Haines, Judge.* Reversed.
Action for declaratory relief.
reversed.

Judgment for defendant

Swing, Scharnikow & Staniforth and Robert 0. Staniforth
for Appellants.
Luce, Forward, Kuuzel & Scripps and James L. l!'ocht,
Jr., for Respondent.
Weinstock, Anderson, Maloney & Chase as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Respondent.
CAI~TER, J.-Plaintiffs Marion Wildman and Elvaree
\Vildman, husband and wife, appeal from a judgment in
favor of Government Employees' Insurance Company.
On February 3, 1955, Eusebio Bonifacio and Cecilia Bonifacio were the owners of a 1953 Cadillac eoupe automobile.
Plaintiff Elvaree suffered personal injuries and the property
of both plaintiffs was damaged, on February 3, 1955, as the
result of the negligent operation of the Cadillac whieh, at
the time of the aecident, was being operated by Victoria
Villaneuva with the permission and consent of the Bonifacios.
Plaintiffs obtained a judgment, whieh is now final, against
Victoria Villaneuva and Cecilia Bonifacio in the sum of
$5,000 and eosts in the sum of $66.90. The judgment is unsatisfied and the Bonifacios are insolvent.
Prior to the time of the aeeident defendant insurance
company had issued to Eusebio Bonifacio a poliey of insurance. Plaintiffs brought an action in declaratory relief to

*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
48 C.2d-2
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obtain a declaration of the legal rights and duties of the
defendant insurance compauy nnder the policy and for a
judgment requiring it to pay the judgment theretofore obtained by plaintiffs against Cecilia Bonifacio. The trial court
concluded that plaintiffs take nothing by their complaint and
entered judgment to the effect that the insurance afforded
by the defendant's policy did not cover the accident.
Plaintiffs contend that the restrichn: endorsement on the
policy is ambiguous. Under the terms of the insurance policy
involved, defendant agreed to indemnify Eusebio Bonifacio
awl Ceeilia Bonif<wio against auy liability not cxeeecling the
sum of $10,000, together with taxed court costs and interest
1rhid1 mig·ht arise against Buscbio and Cvcilia in favor of
any person or persons who should sustain any damage to
their persons or property by reason of an accident incurred
while Eusebio or Cecilia were using the automobile or legally
responsibile for the use thereof, provided the use was with
the consent and permission of Eusebio or Cecilia. An endorsement was attached to the policy, dated Deeember 3,
1954, and proYided:
'' 1. The first sentence of Insuring Agreement III, Definition of Insured, is eliminated and is hereby replaced by the
following:
"With respect to the insurance for Bodily Injury Liability
and Property Damage I,iability the unqualified word 'insured' includes the named insured, the individual named below, and any member of the insuret1 's immediate family
No ExcEPTIONS
while using tlw automobile or legally responsible for the US('
thereof, providl'd the actual use of the automobilco is with
the permission of the named insured.
"2. Such insurance as is afforded by this policy does not
apply while any person not an insured as defined in Paragraph 1 above is using the antornobile, except that such insurance as is afforded for lVIedical Payments applies with
respect to bodily injury to or sidmess, disease or death of
the named insured, the individual named below, aHd any
member of the insured's immediate family.
'' 3. As evidenced by the signature below of the named
insured, the named insured acknowledges and agrees that this
endorsement forms a part of the above captioned policy issued
by the Government Employees Insurance Company and is
effective as of 12 :01 A.M. Standard Time on the effective
date of the endorsement."
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Defendant contends that the endorsement controls, is unand provides coverage only when the automobile
in question is driven by the insured or one of his immediate
family.
[la] We agree with plaintiffs that the endorsement is
ambiguous. If the words "No ExcEPTIONS" were not prrsent,
the policy would read as follows: ''the unqualified word
'insured' indudes the named insnred, the individual named
and any member of the insmed's immediate family
while using the automobile or legally responsible for the use
thereof, provided the actual usc of the automobile is with
the permission of the rwrned insnral." (Emphasis added.)
Paragraph 2 provides that the policy docs not apply while
any person not an insured as defined in Paragraph 1 is using
the ear ''except that'' the provision for medieal payments
applied to the named insured and members of his immediate
family. The question is, to what do the words "No ExcEPTIONS" relate 1 Immediately following the words "No ExCEPTIONS" comes the statement "while using the automobile
or legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actual
nse of the automobile is with the permission of the named
insured." It appears that the "no exceptions" applies to
the named insured and members of his immediate family
while any of them were using the automobile or had conBellied and permitted its use by someone else. The phrase
referring to use with consent and permission would, otherwise, have no effect wl1atsoevcr inasmuch as Eusebio, Cecilia
and members of their immediate family were directly covered
by the policy in the first part of paragraph 1. [2] "It is
elementary in insurance law that any ambiguity or uncertainty in an insurance policy is to be resolved against the
insurer. (Arenson v. National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co. (1955),
supra, 45 Oal.2d 81, 83 [286 P.2d 816]; Coit v. Jefferson
Standard L1:fe Ins. Co. (1946), supra, 28 Cal.2d 1, 3 [168
P.2d 163, 168 A.hR. 673]; 5 Am.Jur. 790, § 507.) [3] If
semantically permissible, the rontract will be given such construction as will fairly achieve its object of securing indemnity
to the insured for the losses to which the insurance relates.
(Fageol T. & C. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co. (1941), ]8 Oal.2d
748, 75] [117 P.2c1 669] .) [4a] If the insurer uses language
which is uncertain any reasonable doubt will be resolved
against it; if the doubt relates to extent or fact of coverage,
wlwther as to prril immrec1 against (Fageol T. & C. Co. v.
Pacific Inclem. Co. (1941), 18 Cal.2d 731, 746-747 [16, 17]
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l117 P.2d 661]; Ocean etc. Corp., Ltd. v. Industrial Ace.
Com. (1924), 194 Cal. 127, 132 [228 P. 1]; Miller v. United
Ins. Co. (1952), 113 Cal.App.2d 493 [248 P.2d 113]; Pendell
v. Westland Life Ins. Co. (1950), 95 Cal.App.2d 766, 770
[214 P.2d 392]; see also Christojjer v. Hartford Ace. etc.
Co. (1954), 123 Cal.App.2d Supp. 979 [267 P.2d 887]), the
amount of liability (Hobson v. Mutual Benefit H.&; A. Assn.
(1950), 99 Cal.App.2d 330, 333 et seq. [221 P.2d 761]; see
also Na1·ver v. California State Life Ins. Co. (1930), 211
Cal. 176, 180 et seq. [294 P. 393]) or the person or persons
protected (Olson v. Standard Marine Ins. Co. (1952), 109
Cal.App.2d 130, 135 [1, 5] [240 P.2d 379]; see also Island
v. Pireman's P1tnd Indem. Co. (1947), 30 Cal.2d 541, 543,
548 [184 P.2d 153, 173 A.L.R. 896]; Sly v. American Indem.
Co. (1932), 127 Cal.App. 202 [15 P.2d 522] ), the language
will be understood in its most inclusive sense, for the benefit
of the insured.'' (Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr.
Co., 46 Cal.2d 423, 437, 438 [296 P.2d 801] .)
In the case under consideration the ambiguous words are
''no exceptions.'' W cbster 's New International Dictionary
defines ''exception'' as an exclusion or taking out by exception something that would otherwise be included. [5] Inasmuch as use by another with the consent and permission of
the insured is specifically set forth later in the same paragraph the words "no exceptions" can hardly be construed to
apply to that situation. Paragraph 2 provides that the medical payments provided for in the policy apply only when
bodily injury or sickness or death is suffered by the named
insured or any member of his immediate family. It appears
that paragraphs 1 and 2 cannot be reconciled insofar as coverage is concerned. [6] Finding II of the trial court ( Cl. Tr.
12) is inconsistent in itself. In that finding the court found
that the defendant agreed to "indemnify the said Eusebio P.
Bonifacio and Cecelia Bonifacio against any liability not exceeding the sum of $10,000.00, together with taxed court costs
and interest, which should arise against the said Eusebio P.
Bonifacio or Cecelia Bonifacio in favor of any person or
persons who should sustain any damage to their property and
also in favor of any person or persons who should sustain
any bodily injuries by rrason of an accident occurring while
the Raid Eusebio P. Bonifacio or Cecelia Bonifacio were using
the said automobile or legally responsible for the use thereof,
provided s1wh use was w1:th thp, permission and consent of
the sa1:d Ensebio P. Bon1:facio or Cecelia Bonifacio, and pro-
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vided further that said automobile was not being used at said
time by any person other than the said Eusebio P. Bonifacio or
Cecelia Bonifacio or members of their immediate family.
" (Emphasis added.) It is apparent from this finding
that the coverage afforded by the policy cannot apply two
ways at the same time: it cannot apply only when one of the
named insureds, or members of their immediate family, are
using the car and also when someone else is driving with the
consent and permission of the insured. [4b] The insurer,
having caused the uncertainty and ambiguity which exists
in the policy under consideration, must have that ambiguity
and uncertainty resolved against it under the well settled
rule in this state and elsewhere. (See Continental Oas. Co. v.
Phoenix Constr. Oo., 46 Cal.2d 423, 437, 438 [296 P.2d 801],
heretofore quoted, and cases cited therein.) ''The language will be understood in its most inclusive sense, for the
benefit of the insured." ( (Jontinental Cas. (Jo. v. Phoenix
Constr. Co., supra, at page 438.) [lb] With these rules in
mind the policy must be construed as extending coverage to
persons suffering bodily injury or property damage caused
by the vehicle in question when it was being driven by the
named insured, or members of their immediate family, and
also by someone else driving the vehicle with the consent and
permission of the named insured. It follows from what
we have said that the trial court erred in concluding that the
policy in question ''did not apply at the time of the accident
on February 3, 1955, when Victoria Villanueva was driving
the Cadillac automobile owned by Eusebio P. Bonifacio and
Cecelia Bonifacio.''
Plaintiffs also contend that if the policy in question does
not apply when the automobile covered is being driven by
someone other than the insured persons but with the consent
and permission of the insured that it violates the provisions
of section 415 of the Vehicle Code. That section, which is
entitled "Contents and Requirements of motor vehicle liability policy" provides as follows:
"RE·QUISITES OF MoTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY PoLICY.
"(a) [Motor vehicle liability policy defined; requirements.]
A 'motor vehicle liability policy,' as used in this code means a
policy of liability insurance issued by an insurance carrier
authorized to transact such business in this State to or for
the benefit of the person named therein as assured, which
policy shall meet the following requirements :
"(1) Such policy shall designate by explicit description
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or
appropriate reference all motor velJicles with respect to
whieh coverage is thereby intended to be granted.
"(2) Such policy shall insure the person named therein
and any other· person using m· responsible for the use of said
motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied
said assured." ( :BJmphasis added.)
[7] Defendant insurance company argues that it had the
right to limit its coverage in a policy of insurance issued by
it ''and when it has clone so, the plain language of the
limitation must be respected." (Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal.2c1 at page 432.) Defendant's argument is without merit. In the Continental Casualty Company
case, the restrictive endorsement defined the vehicles covered
by the policy. It was held not to apply to the coverage on
the authorized vehicles and hence could not apply to the
drivers thereof.
'l'he policy involved here provides, under the heading
'' CoNDI'l'IONS'' in section 8 that ''Such insurance as is afforded by this policy for bodily injury liability or property
damage liability shall comply with the provisions of the motor
vehicle financial responsibility law of any state or province
which shall be applicable with respect to any such liability
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile during the policy period, to the extent of the coverage and limits of liability required by such law, but in no
event in excess of the limits of liability stated in this policy.
The Insured agrees to reimburse the company for any payment made by the eompany which it would not have been
obligated to make under the terms of this policy except for
the agreement contained in this paragraph.'' In section 23,
also under the heading ''CoNDITIONS'' it is stated ''Terms
of Policy Conformed to Statute. 'l'erms of this policy which
are in conflict with the statutes of the State wherein this
policy is issued are hereby amended to conform to such
statutes.''
No case construing section 415 of the Vehicle Code as it
relati•s to the circumstances here present has been cited to
ns, nor has independent research revealed one.* In Northwcst Cas. Co. v. Legg, 91 Cal.App.2d 19, 24 [204 P.2d
106], the court said: "Section 415 is a part of the Financial
Responsibility Ijaw. As such, it is directly related to the
*The question here presented was not determined by this court in
Norris v. Pacific Indem. Co., 39 Cal.2d 420 [247 P.2d 1]; Souza v.
Corti, 22 Cal.2d 454 [139 P.2d 645, 147 A.L.R. 861].
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matter of suspending and reinstating operators' licenses in
with proving ability to respond in damages for
caused to others. Whether or not these provisions
are controlling with respect to the contract which an insurer
may rnake with an ins~tred, and their relation to the provisions
requirements contained in the Insurance Code, need not
be here decided." (Emphasis added.) [8] It appears that
section 415 must be made a part of every policy of insurance
issued by an insurer since the public policy of this state is
to make owners of motor vehicles financially responsible to
those injured by them in the operation of such vehicles.
Section 402 of the Vehicle Code provides that ''Every owner
of a motor vehicle is liable and responsible for the death of
or injury to person or property resulting from negligence in
the operation of such motor vehicle, in the business of such
owner or otherwise, by any person using or operating the
same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner,
and the negligence of such person shall be imputed to the
owner for all purposes of civil damages.'' [9] We are of
the opinion that for an insurer to issue a policy of insurance
which does not cover an accident which occurs when a person,
other than the insured, is driving with the permission and
consent of the insured is a violation of the public policy of
this state as set forth in sections 402 and 415 of the Vehicle
Code. In Malrngren v. Southwestern Auto. Ins. Co., 201 CaL
29, 33, 34 [255 P. 512], an analogous situation was involved.
The insurance carrier sought to avoid liability on the ground
that its liability did not accrue under the policy until an
execution issued upon the judgment obtained against the assured, or judgment debtor, was returned unsatisfied by reason
of the insolvency or bankruptcy of the assured. At that time
the law of this state (Stats. 1919, p. 776) provided that every
policy of insurance should contain a provision that the insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured person should not
release the carrier for the payment of damages sustained. The
court said: ''The statute of this state, which is the final word
on this issue, does not make the return of the execution unsatisfied a prerequisite to the commencement of an action upon
the policy. . . . The substantive law of this state cannot be
enlarged, circumvented, defeated, or modified by any provision which the insurer may have elected to place in its contract in derogation of or in conflict therewith. The statute is
founded upon principles of public policy and an anomalous
situation would be created if the rights of third parties, for
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whose protection the law was adopted, could be hindered,
delayed, or defeated by the private agreements of two of the
parties to a triparty contract." (See also to the same effect,
Hynding v. Home Ace. Ins. Co., 214 Cal. 743, 747 [7 P.2d
999, 85 A.L.R. 13] ; Belt Cas. Co. v. Furman, 218 Cal. 359,
363 [23 P.2d 293]; Western Mach. Co. v. Bankers Indem.
Ins. Co., 10 Cal.2d 488, 492 [75 P.2d 609] ; Olds v. General
Ace. Fire etc. Corp., 67 Cal.App.2d 812, 822 [155 P.2d 676] ;
Bias v. Ohio Farmers Indem. Co., 28 Cal.App.2d 14, 16 [81
P.2d 1057] ; Pigg v. International lndem. Co., 86 Cal.App.
671, 673 [261 P. 486] .)
[10] Inasmuch as sections 402 and 415 of the Vehicle Code
set forth the public policy of this state such laws must be
considered a part of every policy of liability insurance even
though the policy itself does not specifically make such laws
a part thereof. We have here, however, a policy containing a
clause which provides that the insurance afforded by the
policy shall comply with the provisions of the motor vehicle
financial responsibility law "of any state . . . " wherein the
liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of
the automobile may occur.
We conclude that the restrictive endorsement hereinbefore
set forth and discussed is ambiguous; that the construction
thereof urged by defendant insurance carrier would be violative of the sections of the Vehicle Code heretofore discussed;
and that said sections were intended by the Legislature to be,
and are, a part of every policy of motor vehicle liability insurance issued by an insurance carrier authorized to do business in this state.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, ,J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
Spence, .J., and McComb J., concurred in the judgment.
Respondent's petition for a rrhearing was denied March
20, 1957. Spence, .J., and McComb, ,J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

